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The district attorney is a quasi judicial officer. He repre-
sents the commonwealth, and the commonwealth demands no
victims. It seeks justice only,-equal and impartial justice,-
and it is as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no
innocent man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes.
Hence, he should act impartially. He should present the
commonwealth's case fairly, and should not press upon the jury
any deductions from the evidence that are not strictly legiti-
mate. When he exceeds this limit, and in hot zeal seeks to
influence them by appealing to their prejudices, he is no longer
an impartial officer, but becomes a heated partisan.'
The prosecuting attorney occupies a unique position in relation to his
adversary, counsel for the defense. 2 His duty is to seek justice, not merely
to convict every defendant that may be arraigned. 3 As an agent of the
state, 4 the prosecutor must not violate the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair and impartial trial.5 At the same time he represents the people of
the jurisdiction he serves and must assure effective law enforcement and
decisive legal judgment.6 In addition, "[i]t is the duty of the prosecutor to
know and be guided by the standards of professional conduct as defined
in codes and canons of the legal profession." 7
1. Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 270, 18 A. 737, 738 (1889).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, DR 7-103 (adopted by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, February 27, 1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE]; ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNC TION § 1.1 and accompanying commentary (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as
ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION]; H.S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 148 (1953);
NATIONAL DISTICr ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 278-281
(1st ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
3. ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-13. See Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378
A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 18 A. 737 (1889). See also ABA
STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 1. 1(c); WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 320 (2d
ed. 1970).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1402(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See F.B. SMILLIE, MANUAL AND HANDBOOK FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, MAGIS-
TRATES AND CORONERS IN PENNSYLVANIA 29 (1940). See also ABA STANDARDS, PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION, supra note 2, Introduction; NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra
note 2, at 278.
7. ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 1.1(d).
Prosecutors are guided by numerous legislative and judicial rules
and standards, including those relating to the closing argument. The
closing argument is potentially one of the most essential tools of trial
advocacy. By effectively using the argument, a skillful attorney can not
only present his case in a favorable light, but can cast shadows on the
opposition's case.' Because of the importance of the closing argument
and the emotional nature of most criminal cases it is essential that the
defendant be protected from prejudicial closing remarks by a zealous
prosecutor. This comment will define the guidelines and limitations on
prosecutorial summations that have developed to secure this protection.
In addition, the present procedural elements that implement and enforce
these precepts will be analyzed to determine their value in ensuring
impartiality and justice.
II. The Function of the Closing Argument
It is well recognized that the defendant has a constitutional right to
be heard through counsel.' While this constitutional right guarantees
closing arguments, if requested, it does not prohibit either the defendant
or the prosecutor from waiving the right to present a closing argument. 10
Under Pennsylvania law, when both sides elect to present these summa-
tions to the jury, the prosecutor's argument is made last.11 This procedur-
al requirement no doubt reflects the universally noted principle that the
Commonwealth bears the burden of proof and must convince the jury of
the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. 12
The argument to the jury is the culmination of the efforts at trial and
reference may be made to anything that occurred during the litigation at
8. While the guilt or innocence of the accused should not, and does not, hinge on the
skillful summations of opposing counsel, the jurors will be aided in their interpretation and
understanding of the two sides presented by counsel's explanation.
9. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 442 Pa. 18, 274 A.2d 767 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Gray, 441 Pa. 91, 271 A.2d 486 (1970); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 117 Pa. 378, 11 A. 370
(1887); PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; PA. R. CRIM. P. 1116(b).
10. The waiver of a constitutional right must be intentional and knowing to be
effective and will not be presumed. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 441 Pa. 483, 272 A.2d 877
(1971).
11. When the evidence is concluded, each party shall be entitled to present one
closing argument to the jury. Regardless of the number of defendants, and whether
or not a defendant has presented a defense, the attorney for the Commonwealth
shall be entitled to make one argument which shall be made last.
PA. R. Ctum. P. 1116(b).
In Commonwealth v. Gray, 441 Pa. 91,271 A.2d 486 (1970), defense counsel moved that
the summation order be as follows: Commonwealth, defense, Commonwealth rebuttal.
The court held that the constitutional right to a closing argument in no way extended to the
order of summation and ordered the defense to follow the statutory order.
12. See Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970). See also
ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-13. The requirement that the defendant in a criminal case
present his closing argument first has withstood constitutional attack by those claiming it
denies the defendant a more effective argument to the jury, Commonwealth v. Jennings, 442
Pa. 18, 274 A.2d 767 (197.1), and by those who assert that it shifts the burden of proof to the
accused, Commonwealth v. Toney, 439 Pa. 173, 266 A.2d 732 (1970). In Toney the proce-
dure was reluctantly upheld by the court, which ruled that the trial judge's instructions and
defendant's failure to object had eliminated the effect of shifting the burden of proof.
hand.13 Basically, the prosecutor should direct his argument to the evi-
dence presented. He should discuss and analyze the issues and summarize
the evidence' 4 as it pertains to his burden of proof. He may refer to the
credibility of the witnesses and interpret and argue the evidence to the
jury.' 5 The prosecutor's goal is to guide the jurors to properly determine
guilt, but any step beyond impartiality is unethical since it may be
prejudicial' 6 to the defendant. '
7
III. Restrictions on the Prosecutor's Closing Argument
Pennsylvania courts have adopted specific guidelines governing per-
missible and impermissible argument,' 8 although there are few statutory
guidelines.' 9 The purpose of these guidelines is to guard against the
prejudice that might result from improper remarks by the prosecution.
A. Comments Relating to the Defendant or the Defense
1. Comments Referring to the Defendant.-Not all remarks by the
prosecution in the course of summation that refer to the accused are
improper or prejudicial. There are, however, certain remarks that should
prompt defense counsel to object. While many of these comments are not
easily categorized, the following classification scheme can be discerned.
(a) Comments relating to character or reputation.-There is no burden
on the defendant to establish his previous good reputation, and, if he fails
13. J.A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENT, THE ART AND THE LAW 3 (1969 & Supp. 1976).
14. "Pennsylvania courts have allowed the prosecution broad latitude in presenting its
summation to the jury. Thus, a district attorney may argue all facts introduced into evidence
and he may draw all the reasonable inferences from these facts." Commonwealth v.
Shaffer, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 564, 565-66, 307 A.2d 394, 395 (1973).
15. See generally Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Arguments, 28
Sw. L.J. 505 (1974) (analyzing Texas law); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note
2, at 278-79.
16. Prejudice-A forejudgment: bias; preconceived opinion. A leaning towards one
side of a cause for some reason other than a conviction of its justice. Prejudicial Error-
Error substantially affecting appellant's legal rights and obligations. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1343 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
17. [T]he law anent jury argument generally lacks specific rules and is not so
technical as other bodies of law. . . .Very often appellate courts overlook offen-
sive argument and sustain a jury verdict upon a finding of no prejudice. A case-by-
case approach is followed. Accordingly, counsel are admonished to pay close
attention to their opponent's argument and to object seasonably with a mind
towards the record and protecting themselves from a waiver of error.
STEIN, supra note 13, at 3-4.
18. See Note, Prejudicial Remarks of Prosecuting Attorneys in the Pennsylvania
Courts, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 496 (1937-38). See generally Bouska, The Prosecutor's Closing
Argument in Kansas, 17 KAN. L. REV. 419 (1969); Crump, The Function and Limits of
Prosecution Jury Arguments, 28 Sw. L.J. 505 (1974); Hall, The Bounds of Prosecutorial
Summation in Arkansas, 28 ARK. L. REV. 55 (1974); Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with
Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1956);
Rothblatt, Summation in Criminal Cases, 37 TENN. L. REV. 728 (1970); Vess, Walking a
Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Closing Argument, 64J. CRIM. L. &
C. 22 (1973); Comment, The Paradox of the Prosecutor: Justice Versus Conviction During
Closing Argument, 34 LA. L. REV. 746 (1974).
19. See note 49 infra.
to do so, no adverse inference may be drawn. 20 Similarly, no adverse
inference may be drawn merely because the accused has called a limited
number of witnesses to testify to his good reputation, or because he has
failed to call a particular character witness. 2 Once the defendant attempts
to establish his good character the prosecutor may counter such evidence
and refer to it during closing. 22 The prosecutor may not, however, make
references to the defendant's character or reputation that have no factual
basis in the record.
23
In Commonwealth v. Adkins,24 for example, the district attorney
argued a motive theory that had no factual basis in the record and thereby
indicated that the defendant had engaged in other criminal activity. The
supreme court ordered a new trial since this information was clearly
prejudicial and may have influenced the jury. To be sure, no defendant
should be compelled to stand trial for a bad reputation or prior criminal
record. 25 While this information may be logically relevant, it can easily
prejudice a jury to convict, not on the basis of the facts presented, but in
an effort to protect society from undesirable elements. 26 For this reason,
20. Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974). See notes 122-37
and accompanying text infra.
21. Id. (minister or priest and neighbors from the community when defendant called
only his mother, father, and girlfriend). See also Commonwealth v. Jacobs, - Pa. Super.
Ct. -, 372 A.2d 873 (1977); Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680
(1974).
22. The court in Commonwealth v. McHugh, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 568, 145 A.2d 8%
(1958), noted,
A district attorney in his closing address or argument may properly state
reasonable inferences from the facts and comment with some severity, in proper
cases, upon the credibility of defendants' testimony . . . . [Hie may press with
zeal the Commonwealth's case and by fair arguments discredit that of the prisoner
Id. at 573, 145 A.2d at 899 (quoting in part from Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25,
30, 191 A. 358, 361 (1937)). See also Commonwealth v. Narr, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 148, 96 A.2d
155 (1953) (prosecutor was allowed to offer fifteen prior burglary convictions in defendant's
burglary trial during rebuttal, and it was held permissible to characterize the accused as an
ex-con" in closing).
[W]here proof of other crimes is admitted into evidence for impeachment
purposes to bear on the credibility of the accused or another witness, counsel may
only refer to the subject of prior crimes during argument in a manner consistent
with the purpose for which the evidence was received.
STEIN, supra note 13, at 26.
23. Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976); cf. Commonwealth v.
Fairbanks, 453 Pa. 90, 306 A.2d 866 (1973) (to bolster his motive theory the prosecutor
portrayed the defendant as a "tough guy from the Black Mafia" who worked as an
"executioner" or "enforcer" and had no alternative but to kill the victim to preserve his
reputation). See Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976).
ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.9 provides, "It is unpro-
fessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to refer to or to argue on the basis of facts
outside the record whether at trial or on appeal .... " See also ABA CODE, supra note 2,
DR 7-106(C) (1). See notes 171-79 and accompanying text infra.
24. 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976).
25. For an opinion expounding upon the prejudice resulting from the introduction of a
defendant's prior conviction for murder and his subsequent pardon, see Justice Musman-
no's dissent in Commonwealth v. Cannon, 386 Pa. 62, 70, 123 A.2d 675, 680, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 898 (1956).
26. Id.
courts have been quite willing to deem such references sufficient reason
for reversal.
27
(b) Characterizations of the accused.-Related to commentary on the
character of the accused are those statements designed to debase the
defendant in the eyes of the jury. "It is no part of a district attorney's
duty, and it is not his right, to stigmatize a defendant.' '28 The application
of epithets to a person accused of a crime may influence the jurors'
deliberations by injecting into their considerations the personal beliefs of
the prosecutor. 29 Not every characterization of a defendant will, however,
be deemed prejudicial.3 0 In making their final determination courts con-
sider such matters as weight of the evidence against the defendant,
deducibility of the characterization from the evidence, and the effect of
the statement on the jury.
31
Pennsylvania case law reveals a fairly consistent attempt to limit the
latitude of these descriptive, though not necessarily accurate, depictions.
References to the accused as a "sex pervert''32 or statements that the
defense presented is "a typical gunman's defense" '3 3 have been held
unobjectionable. Both of these remarks were based on evidence and were
deemed to be within the bounds of legitimate advocacy. But references to
the defendant in stronger terms such as "a cold blooded killer" 34 or as
27. See Commonwealth v. Townsell, -Pa. -, 379 A.2d 98 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976); Commonwealth v. Fairbanks, 453 Pa. 90, 306 A.2d
866 (1973); Commonwealth v. Williams, 309 Pa. 529, 164 A. 532 (1932); Commonwealth v.
Valle, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 411, 362 A.2d 1021 (1976).
28. Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 204, 185 A. 203, 205 (1936). See also
STEIN, supra note 13, at 62-63.
29. Commonwealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974); Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 185 A.
203 (1936). See notes 129-37 and accompanying text infra.
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as
a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility
of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of
an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or
conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.
ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-106.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his personal belief
or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the
defendant.
ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8.
30. See generally Bishop, Name Calling: Defendant Nomenclature in Criminal Trials,
4 OHIo N.L. REV. 38 (1977).
31. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 937 (1969) ("did you see the eyes on that killer"-not sufficient to warrant grant of
new trial); Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955) (prosecutor said
that defendant "lied about where he got the gun"--objection not timely and no abuse of
discretion); Commonwealth v. Narr, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 148, 96 A.2d 155 (1953) ("excon-
vict" and "rattlesnake'--no objection and no abuse of discretion).
32. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 121, 130, 118 A.2d 258, 262 (1955),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 823 (1956) (sodomy prosecution in which prosecutor's characteriza-
tion of defendant was found to be within bounds of legitimate advocacy).
33. Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 299 Pa. 547, 554-55, 149 A. 696, 699 (1930).
34. Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 204, 185 A. 203, 205 (1936).
"vicious," a "liar," or an "Al Capone' ' 35 "far [exceed] the bounds of
propriety necessary to ensure that the accused is afforded a fair trial and to
uphold the integrity of the office of prosecutor." 36
The distinction between proper and improper characterization ap-
pears to be drawn where legitimate inferences from the evidence end.
37
Certainly the prosecutor should be allowed some latitude to argue his case
effectively before the jury. He should not be limited to the presentation of
a lecture, void of any emotion, description, analogy, or illustration.
While the prosecutor must act impartially, he would be a poor advocate
indeed if he did not display conviction in the case he was arguing on
behalf of his community. Therefore, a strict attitude toward remarks
about the accused may overprotect the defendant. Most assuredly, de-
fense counsel will vigorously appeal for an acquittal or sympathy and
mercy. The prosecution should thus be permitted to make fair yet descrip-
tive characterizations of the accused as warranted by the evidence .38
(c) Attacks on race, religion, or nationality.-Because of the paucity
of case law on point, it would appear that Pennsylvania prosecutors have
had little difficulty in complying with the prohibition against inciting jury
prejudice by referring to the defendant's race, religion, or national ori-
gin. 39 Generally such references tend to affect the impartiality of the
jury4' and may abridge the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial.4 1
35. Commonwealth v. Valle, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 411, 415, 362 A.2d 1021, 1023 (1976).
36. Id. at 415, 362 A.2d at 1023. "The closing argument demonstrated a highly
regrettable zeal for conviction which caused the prosecutor to lose sight of his duty to
remain objective and not to exploit the influence of his office." Id. See also Commonwealth
v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 185, 368 A.2d 253, 259 (1977) ("executioner"); Commonwealth v.
Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 337, 365 A.2d 1233, 1235 (1976) ("leader of this pack of murderers");
Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 527, 317 A.2d 205, 206 (1974) ("hoodlums,"
"animals"); Commonwealth v. Fairbanks, 453 Pa. 90, 99, 306 A.2d 866, 871 (1973) ("tough
guy from the Black Mafia," "executioner," "enforcer"); Commonwealth v. Williams, 309
Pa. 529, 533, 164 A. 532, 533 (1932) ("A cold, bloodless demon").
37. See notes 122-37 and accompanying text infra.
38. See Commonwealth v. Walters, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 1232 (1977).
39. ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8 provides,
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or
prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than
the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.
See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
40. See United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1973);
People v. Jones, 205 Cal. App. 2d 460, 23 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962); Contee v. State, 223 Md.
575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960); State v. Dunlop, 61 N.J. Super. 582, 161 A.2d 760 (1960); People v.
Cady, 37 App. Div. 2d 973, 327 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 906, 335 N.Y.S.2d
565, 287 N.E.2d 271 (1972).
41. United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1973). The
court stressed that
the purpose and spirit of the fourteenth amendment requires that prosecutions in
state courts be free of racially prejudicial slurs in argument. The standard for state
prosecution in this regard is thus as high as the rigorous standard required of the
federal courts by the fifth amendment's due process clause.
Id. at 159. See also STEIN, supra note 13, at 65-68.
In United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick42 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, "Racially prejudicial remarks are
. . .so likely to prevent the jury from deciding a case in an impartial
manner and so difficult, if not impossible, to correct once introduced, that
a good argument for applying a more absolute standard [than 'harmless
error'] may be made." 43 Despite this dictum, not all such remarks are
considered prejudicial, and courts have recognized that their use solely
for identification purposes is permissible." Also, remarks based on
evidence produced at trial are not objectionable.4 5 The ultimate question
is to what extent the jury was prejudiced, and in each case this determina-
tion is affected by the parties, the issues, and the general atmosphere of
the trial. 46 While the respective classification of the defendant is some-
times properly in issue, such remarks are otherwise irrelevant and do not
further the quasi-judicial function of the state's attorney.4'
(d) Comments on the failure to testify.
(i) Failure to call the defendant.-Before Griffin v. California," pros-
ecutorial reference to the accused's failure to take the stand was governed
by state statutory and constitutional restraints. 9 This prohibition was
42. 481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1973) (repeated references to "colored people" as a separate
entity provoked racial prejudice).
43. Id. at 161. The court did not decide if such remarks are prejudicial per se. See
Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970).
44. People v. Agron, 10 N.Y.2d 130, 218 N.Y.S.2d 625, 176 N.E.2d 556 cert. denied,
368 U.S. 922 (1961). But see United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152 (2d
Cir. 1973); People v. Williams, 40 App. Div. 2d 812, 338 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1972); People v.
Burris, 19 App. Div. 2d 557, 241 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1963).
45. State v. Dunlop, 61 N.J. Super. 582, 161 A.2d 760 (1960).
46. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946).
It would seem difficult, if not impossible, for an appellate court to adequately weigh
these factors when it has only the bare record of the trial court proceedings. Therefore,
defense counsel's alertness and the trial judge's vigilance are vital to the protection of the
defendant from subtle improprieties. See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note
2, at 281.
47. See People v. Matthews, 33 App. Div. 2d 679, 305 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1969) ("the
assistant district attorney's improper remarks may not be justified on the ground of improp-
rieties in the summation of defense counsel"). Id. at 680, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 920. But cf.
People v. Cady, 37 App. Div. 2d 973, 327 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 906, 335
N.Y.S.2d 565, 287 N.E.2d 271 (1971) (the court noted that the defense had first raised the
issue of racial prejudice and the district attorney did not exceed bounds of propriety by
alluding to it).
48. 380 U.S. 609 (1965), noted, 70 DICK. L. REV. 98 (1965).
49. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 enumerates the following rights:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and
his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give evidence
against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.
Similarly, the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, § 10, (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631
(Purdon 1964)) provides,
Except defendants actually upon trial in a criminal court, any competent
witness may be compelled to testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal; but he may
not be compelled to answer any question which, in the opinion of the trial judge,
enforced even more strictly by Pennsylvania courts than other limitations
on prosecution summations.i0 Violation of the restriction, nevertheless,
was not grounds for reversal unless the effect was "adverse" to the
defendant. 51 This practice was not universal, however, and six states
allowed some comment on the silence of the accused. 52 In Griffin53 the
United States Supreme Court ruled
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Feder-
al Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prose-
cution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that
such silence is evidence of guilt.Y
Despite the unequivocal rule laid down in Griffin, it was unclear
whether all comment was prohibited. 55 It appears that Pennsylvania has
retained the "adverse" standard in conjunction with the standard pro-
pounded in Griffin. 56 This dual standard does not presume that such
remarks by the prosecution are prejudicial per se. It is the prosecutor's
burden, however, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt57 that the violation
would tend to criminate him; nor may the neglect or refusal of any defendant,
actually upon trial in a criminal court, to offer himself as a witness be treated as
creating any presumption against him, or be adversely referred to by court or
counsel during the trial.
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 275 Pa. 137, 118 A.2d 667 (1922) for a thorough review of
the statutory history culminating in the Act of 1887. Federal courts-are governed directly by
the fifth amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948) (enacted originally on March 16,1878). See
generally Note, Comments to the Jury on Defendant's Failure to Testify, 64 DICK. L. REV.
164 (1960).
50. Commonwealth v. Zukovsky, 324 Pa. 588, 188 A. 349 (1936); Commonwealth v.
Green, 233 Pa. 291,82 A. 250 (1912); Commonwealth v. Foley, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 414 (1904).
51. See Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, § 10, (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631
(Purdon 1964)), quoted at note 49 supra. But cf. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 275 Pa. 137, 118
A. 667 (1922) (the court found the remark not to be "adverse"). See also cases cited at note
50 supra.
52. California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio. Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 611-12 n.3 (1965). See generally Comment, The Fifth Amendment
and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L REV.
470, 470-75 (1974); 38 TEMP. L.Q. 102 (1964).
53. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
54. Id. at 615. The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment was made applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
55. 70 DICK. L. REV. 98, 123 (1965). The Griffin decision failed to specify whether
comment upon the accused's failure to testify was reversible error per se. See note 57 infra.
56. In Commonwealth v. Reichard, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 55, 59, 233 A.2d 603, 605
(1967), Judge Hoffman indicated that the ruling in Griffin "comports with our interpretation
of the Pennsylvania Statute [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (Purdon 1964)]." Commonwealth
v. Brenizer, 467 Pa. 347, 456 A.2d 784 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307
A.2d 255 (1973); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171,305 A.2d 715 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
57. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967), noted, 71
DICK. L. REV. 686 (1967), followed, Commonwealth v. Cooper, 468 Pa. 481, 364 A.2d 296
(1976); Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971). For a case holding to a
stricter rule than Griffin (i.e., that such error is prejudicial per se), see State v. Smith, 101
Ariz. 407, 420 P.2d 278 (1966) (prejudicial effect presumed and error deemed fundamental).
Contra, State v. Burrell, 102 Ariz. 136, 426 P.2d 633 (1967). See Field, Assessing the
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 15 (1976); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 814 (1970).
of a constitutional right is harmless. 5" This rule is based on the common
law harmless-error rule that "put the burden on the beneficiary of the
error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his
erroneously obtained judgment." 59
It should also be noted that Pennsylvania courts recognize that unless
it is made promptly, an objection to an adverse remark on the accused's
failure to testify may be waived 6° and that even if the objection is properly
raised, the judge may rectify the impropriety by curative instructions. 61 In
Commonwealth v. Maloney62 the court specifically ruled that adequate
instructions under some circumstances may cure improper reference to
the accused's silence. 63 The test set forth by the court leaves the matter
within the sound discretion of the trial judge subject to appellate review.
64
The court listed the following considerations 65 as the components of its
test: (1) the nature of the reference, (i.e., specific comment or merely a
reference that the Commonwealth's case was not contradicted)' and (2)
exploitation of the accused's silence by the district attorney 67
In addition, the mere mention of the defendant's silence by defense
counsel does not sanction a companion comment by the prosecutor.
68
The Pennsylvania rule was articulated by the supreme court in Commonwealth v.
Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973):
This reasonable doubt standard reflects a fundamental belief that once
constitutional error has been established, it is far worse to conclude incorrectly
that the error was harmless than it is to conclude incorrectly that the error was
reversible....
[W]e must determine whether 'there is a reasonable possibility' that the
constitutional error 'might have contributed to the conviction.' . . If there is such
a possibility the constitutional error is reversible. But if there is no reasonable
possibility that the constitutional error might have moved 'the minds of an average
jury' toward conviction, then it cannot be said that the error was harmless.
Cases subsequent to Chapman have established one exception to the general
proposition that if there is a reasonable possibility that the constitutional error
might have contributed to the conviction, the error cannot be harmless. That
exception is presented by those cases where the 'properly admitted evidence of
guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the . . . [constitutional
error] is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that the . . [constitutional error] was harmless error.'
Id. at 177, 178, 305 A.2d at 719. See Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800, 806
n. 12 (1977) (court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming that the prosecutor's improper closing argument constituted harmless error).
58. Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973).
59. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
60. Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 Pa. 512, 359 A.2d 393 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Adams, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 475, 341 A.2d 206 (1975); Commonwealth v. Howard, 212 Pa.
Super. Ct. 100, 239 A.2d 829 (1968).
61. Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976). Compare
Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 169 A.2d 780 (1961) with Commonwealth v. Reichard,
211 Pa. Super. Ct. 55, 233 A.2d 603 (1967).
62. 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976).
63. Id. at 349, 365 A.2d at 1241.
64. Id.
65. The court does not consider this list exclusive. Id.
66. See notes 75-86 and accompanying text infra.
67. Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 349, 365 A.2d 1237, 1241 (1976).
68. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 468 Pa. 481, 364 A.2d 296 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Stafford, 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d 590, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
Because the silence of the defendant constitutes the exercise of a constitu-
tionally protected right, the courts are stricter in this regard than with
other matters, such as reputation, when a comment or evidence presented
by defense counsel can open new avenues for rebuttal by the prosecutor.
Commonwealth v. Darnell69 introduced an exception to this rule. In
Darnell defense counsel remarked that the jury should not think ill of the
defendant because he had failed to testify since this conduct was intended
to save the time of the jury and the court. The superior court found these
remarks "absurd" and held that the district attorney's question to the jury
whether the defendant's silence was because of the reason given by
defense counsel or some other reason was "reasonable and restrained
under the circumstances and intended merely to negate the reason set
forth by defense counsel. "70
Pennsylvania courts have adopted the Griffin approach that not
every remark is reversible error, and this appears to be the most appropri-
ate resolution. While there may be compelling reasons why an innocent
defendant would not wish to testify, his failure to do so tends to indicate
that there may be something to hide. 71 His failure to testify has already
been noted by the jury, and some prosecution comments might do no
additional harm.72 This latitude, however, should be carefully controlled
so that only those comments that can have no harmful effect on the
defendant come before the jury.
Leaving the matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge
should adequately protect the rights of the accused. The judge is in the
best position to evaluate the impact of such remarks, and he may be able
to correct or avert additional damage that may result, thereby eliminating
the need for what may be unnecessary retrials. While the defendant
should not be penalized for exercising a constitutional right, adherence to
69. 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 461, 116 A.2d 310 (1955).
70. Id. at 464, 116 A.2d at 312. See Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 38 Erie 222 (Pa. C.P.
1953). See also notes 105-09 and accompanying text infra.
71. It is not everyone who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely
innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing
others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and of-
fenses charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree
as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not everyone,
however honest, who would, therefore willingly be placed on the witness stand.
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, at 66 (1893). A defendant might also refuse to testify
to prevent introduction of evidence of his prior convictions to impeach him. See also 8 J.
WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2272 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But note Justice Stewart's dissent in
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965) (Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting):
[N]o one can say where the balance of advantage might lie as a result of the
attorneys' discussion of the matter. No doubt the prosecution's argument will seek
to encourage the drawing of inferences unfavorable to the defendant. However,
the defendant's counsel equally has an opportunity to explain the various other
reasons why a defendant may not wish to take the stand, and thus rebut the natural
if uneducated assumption that it is because the defendant cannot truthfully deny
the accusations made.
Id. at 621-22.
72. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965) (Stewart & White, JJ., dissent-
ing). In some instances the objection itself may do more harm than the obscure remark by
the district attorney.
a stricter standard could hamper the effective presentation of the state's
case. 73 If the prosecutor can satisfy the burden of proving that the
comment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt74 there appears to be
no reason for ordering a new trial.
(ii) Failure to call other witnesses. -No adverse remarks may be made
because the accused has called only certain witnesses 75 or because he has
failed to call any at all. 76 It is well settled, however, that statements to the
jury that the Commonwealth's case is uncontradicted do not constitute
grounds for reversal. 77 Nevertheless, these remarks must not violate the
Griffin78 rule by emphasizing that only the defendant could rebut the
state's case. 79 The trial judge can adequately assure that if the defendant
is the only possible witness or if the state's evidence cannot be contradict-
ed because of the circumstances of the case he will not be penalized for
exercising his constitutional right to remain silent.8°
In Commonwealth v. Davis8 the defendant neither testified nor
offered any defense. The supreme court stressed that the prosecutor's use
of the terms "uncontroverted" and "uncontroverted fact" in referring to
the defense during his closing argument violated both the Griffin mandate
and the Act of 1887.82 In concluding that there was "a reasonable
73. See Justice Pomeroy's dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Brenizer, 467 Pa.
347, 352, 356 A.2d 784, 786 (1976), arguing that the prosecutor must be allowed "reasonable
latitude" in the presentation of his case. See also Stern & Kellar, The Right to Comment
Upon Failure of a Party or Witness to Testify, 26 PA. BA. A.Q. 281 (1955).
74. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
75. Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974); Commonwealth v. Black, 186 Pa. Super. Ct.
160, 142 A.2d 495 (1958). But see Commonwealth v. Boyd, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 1253 (1977).
76. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 372 A.2d 873 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Wiggins, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 71,328 A.2d 520 (1974); Commonwealth v. Miller, 205
Pa. Super. Ct. 297, 208 A.2d 867 (1965). See generally NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
supra note 2, at 279.
77. Commonwealth v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1, 326 A.2d 303 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Allen, 445 Pa. 156, 281 A.2d 634 (1971) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Bolish,
381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 471, 364 A.2d
368 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 563, 327 A.2d 375 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 89, 140 A.2d 347 (1958); Commonwealth v. Bova, 180
Pa. Super. Ct. 459, 119 A.2d 866 (1956); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 180 Pa. Super. Ct.
121, 118 A.2d 258 (1956).
[I]t is universally agreed that counsel may not only state his views of the
evidence, but that he may argue the conclusions and inferences the jury may fairly
draw from the evidence. Thus, counsel may review the evidence adduced at trial
and suggest to the jury whether or not the burden of proof has been met, whether
or not contested and uncontested facts have been proved, and what verdict the jury
should reach consistent with the evidence.
STEIN, supra note 13, at 19.
78. See notes 48-74 and accompanying text supra.
79. Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 563, 327 A.2d 375 (1974); Commonwealth v. Reichard, 211 Pa.
Super. Ct. 55, 233 A.2d 603 (1967).
80. See cases cited at note 79 supra.
81. 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973).
82. See note 49 supra. The court applied the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard for constitutional error. See note 57 supra for further discussion of the substance
of the test.
possibility that the prosecutor's unconstitutional argument 'might have
contributed to the conviction,' 8 3 the court considered the evidence
against the defendant, 4 which was far from overwhelming, and undoubt-
edly also the imposition of the death penalty. Justice Pomeroy dissented
on this issue though he concurred in the result for other reasons.8 5 He
contended that the majority was in effect prohibiting proper criticism of
the strength of the prosecution's case by confusing fair argument with
adverse comment on the exercise of a constitutional right. While he
agreed that the state should not be allowed to exploit the defendant's
invocation of the right to remain silent, he maintained that the accused
who avails himself of the right should not be "entitled to impose on the
prosecution shackles that would be unavailable to a man who testifies in
his own defense.'' 86 According to Pomeroy's view, the prosecution
should be allowed some latitude to effectively argue the weight of the
evidence to the jury. Proper argument and conclusions from the evidence
reinforces the strength of the prosecution's case and will do no more
damage to the defense than has already been done by allowing the
evidence to go uncontradicted.
2. Comments Concerning the Defendant's Case.
(a) Comments critical of the defendant's version of the facts.-It is a
common practice for the prosecution in its summation to refer to and
comment upon the defendant's case. Pennsylvania courts are careful,
however, to contain these remarks within the boundaries marked by the
evidence. Any remarks that may mislead or improperly influence the jury
are impermissible.87 "But even where the language of the district attor-
ney is intemperate, uncalled for and improper a new trial is not necessari-
ly required. "88
For example, the district attorney made the following comments
about the defendant's version of the events in Commonwealth v.
The distinction between permissible comment that the state's case is uncontradicted
and the Davis holding no doubt lies in the fact that the defendant did not testify and offered
no other witnesses or evidence at trial. The court noted, "[l1t would be an act of sophistry to
conclude that the remarks of the assistant district attorney could have been taken as
anything other than a reference to the fact that appellant, and appellant alone, failed to rebut
the evidence against him." Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa., 171 176, 305 A.2d 715, 718
(1973).
83. Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 180, 305 A.2d 715, 720 (1973) (quoting in
part from Rodriquez-Sandoval v. United States, 409 F.2d 529, 531 (1st Cir. 1969)).
84. Id. at 180, 305 A.2d at 720-21.
85. Id. at 181, 305 A.2d at 721.
86. Id. at 183, 305 A.2d at 722 (quoting from United States v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1266,
1268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1969)).
87. Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Revty, 448 Pa. 512, 295 A.2d 300 (1972); Commonwealth v. Williams, 309 Pa. 529, 164 A. 532
(1932).
88. Commonwealth v. Stolzfus, 462 Pa. 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975). See
Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 253, 335 A.2d 751 (1975).
Stoltzfus.89 "[I]f it weren't for the tragedy of this case, those lines would
be some of the funniest lines in the court room, because they are utterly
unbelievable.' 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the remarks
were partly inspired by defense counsel and that the trial judge's refusal
to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.9 Likewise, in
Commonwealth v. Stasko92 the single irresponsible remark of the prose-
cutor was not found prejudicial to any significant extent and was suffi-
ciently cured by timely objection and corrective instruction.
93
The formula used by the courts to decide whether the remarks are
objectionable is that
[t]he language must be such that its 'unavoidable effect would
be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and
hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the
evidence and render a true verdict. . . . The effect of such
remarks depends upon the atmosphere of the trial, and the
proper action to be taken is within the discretion of the trial
court. 94
It could be inferred from Stoltzfus95 that Pennsylvania courts are relative-
ly lenient in viewing statements characterizing the defendant's case. The
remark may be acceptable even if it contains the subtle opinion of the
district attorney if the opinion is based on the evidence and it is deemed to
have had little impact on the jurors. This determination rests squarely
within the discretion of the trial judge.96 To avoid the need for such a
determination the prosecutor should limit his analysis to accurate descrip-
tions of the case presented and refrain from presenting his personal beliefs
to the jury.
97
89. 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975).
90. Id. at 60, 337 A.2d at 881-82.
91. Id. at 61, 337 A.2d at 882. See also Commonwealth v. Talley, 456 Pa. 574, 318
A.2d 922 (1974) (adequate protection by trial judge) (Roberts, J., dissented, arguing that
introduction of prosecutor's opinion is impermissible and deprived the defendant of a fair
trial); Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680 (1974) (characterization of
defendant's story as "tale" held not error); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d
732 (1973) ("liars" not objected to and trial judge adequately instructed)' Commonwealth v.
Markle, 67 Berks 104 (Pa. C.P. 1974) ("When you don't have too much as a defense you
attack the witnesses" held not prejudicial).
92. 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977).
93. In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor referred to Stasko's testimony
in setting the scene of the crime: "All right, then he said something about the car wouldn't
start. I won't accept that, but let's go with what he said. The car wouldn't start, and he
wants to help." Id. at 386, 370 A.2d at 357. See notes 129-137, 214-225 and accompanying
text infra.
94. Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975) (quoting in
part from Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 394, 248 A.2d 289, 292 (1968)). See
Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977).
95. 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975).
96. Cf. Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977) (immediate
objection and proper instruction by trial court were deemed sufficient to cure error).
97. See ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-106(C)(4); ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(a), (b) and accompanying commentary. See also notes 171-76
and accompanying text infra.
(b) Comments directed at defense counsel.-Accepted ethical stan-
dards prohibit an attorney from making unfair or derogatory reference to
opposing counsel. 98 Standing alone, however, attacks on defense counsel
may not be sufficiently severe to prejudice the defendant. 99 It must be
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the prosecutor did
not result in an unfair trial or prevent the jury from objectively weighing
the issues. 10o
In Commonwealth v. Williams"0 ' the closing argument was "chiefly
an arraignment of defendant's counsel," and the record was "literally
strewn with improper statements and remarks." 102 The court noted that
such conduct could not be lightly pushed aside when the case involved a
serious criminal charge and the defendant had been sentenced to death.
The court held that this harangue was prejudicial to the defendant. 103
Generally jurors will be able to consider these comments at face
value and ignore them in their deliberations. This possibility is doubtful,
however, in such flagrant cases as Williams. The courts will closely
scrutinize cases in which the sentence is extreme (as in Williams) or the
evidence of guilt is far from overwhelming. The number of critical
comments and evidence of excessive prosecutorial zeal both tend to
magnify what would probably be nonprejudicial in a more subdued
presentation. ' 04
Often, defense counsel will provoke or elicit comments from the
prosecution. Pennsylvania courts view these retaliatory remarks in a
much more liberal light than those initiated by the prosecutor. 10 5 Justifi-
98. ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-37, EC 7-38, EC 7-39. A violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is not per se reversible error. Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa.
Super. Ct. 153, 335 A.2d 751 (1975).
99. Commonwealth v. Toney, 439 Pa. 173,266 A.2d 732 (1970).
100. Id. at 180, 266 A.2d at 736.
101. 309 Pa. 529, 164 A. 532 (1932).
102. Id. at 534-35, 164 A. at 534 (included in the prosecutor's arsenal of comments were
the following: statement made by defense counsel was a lie; when using phrases "false
defense," 'sex perversion," and "'rotten bones" the prosecutor pointed his finger at
defense counsel; defense counsel speaks in defense of murder; defense counsel had gone
through a period of insanity or a paroxysm of insanity; and the prosecutor was not making
fun of defense counsel because nature had performed that act).
103. Cf. Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975). See Common-
wealth v. Toney, 439 Pa. 173, 266 A.2d 732 (1970); Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375,
150 A. 649 (1930); Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 256, 361 A.2d 750 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Carr, 137 Pa. Super. Ct. 546, 10 A.2d 133 (1940); Commonwealth v.
Exler, 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 423 (1915); Commonwealth v. Markle, 67 Berks 104 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
104. Commonwealth v. Williams, 309 Pa. 529, 164 A. 532 (1932). See also Common-
wealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976) (statement that defense counsel
apparently did not believe his own client); Commonwealth v. Toth, 455 Pa. 154, 314 A.2d
275 (1974) (comment that defense counsel apparently did not believe defendant's witness'
testimony).
105. Commonwealth v. Perkins, - Pa. -, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d
590, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375, 150 A. 649
(1930); Commonwealth v. Cicere, 282 Pa. 492, 128 A. 446 (1925); Commonwealth v.
cation may alleviate what under ordinary circumstances would have been
a prejudicial statement.'°6 Nevertheless, if actual prejudice appears to
have resulted to the defendant, an appellate court will readily overturn a
conviction. 1
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Thus, defense counsel owes a duty to his client to reduce the
possibility of improper remarks by the prosecutor. Failure to adequately
guard against his attacks may constitute a lack of adequate representation
of the defendant. 10 8 The prosecutor, however, should avoid any appear-
ance of retaliatory advocacy. He represents the criminal justice system
and in this capacity he should strive to maintain its integrity and impar-
tiality. 109
(c) Comments critical of defense witnesses.-In his summation a prose-
cutor may fairly comment upon and evaluate the character of any witness
who has testified at trial. 10 He may also draw reasonable inferences from
such evidence."' Any attempt to unfairly prejudice the jury against the
defendant through disparagement of his witnesses is improper, however,
and may constitute reversible error."
2
In Commonwealth v. Toth" 3 the district attorney misled the jury as
to the purpose of one of defendant's witnesses. The testimony had been
offered for the narrow purpose of proving that the three prosecution
witnesses had fabricated their testimony to implicate the defendant and
receive lenient treatment from the district attorney. The defendant had
called a prisoner who had heard two of the witnesses discuss their plan. In
response to a hearsay objection by the prosecution, defense counsel
claimed that the testimony was offered "not for the truth of the matter,
but to prove the statement was made." 4 The district attorney thereupon
argued to the jury that apparently defense counsel did not believe its
witness. This distortion was deemed reversible error since its effect was
Wiggins, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 256, 361 A.2d 750 (1976); Commonwealth v. McHugh, 187 Pa.
Super. Ct. 568, 145 A.2d 896 (1958); Commonwealth v. Lynott, 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 565, 3
A.2d 207 (1938); Commonwealth v. Schoenleber & Patterson, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 76 (1936).
106. See Commonwealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975); Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 337
A.2d 873 (1975).
107. Commonwealth v. Forgione, 114 Pa. Super. Ct. 275, 173 A. 729 (1934).
108. ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-1, EC 7-9, EC 7-10, DR 7-101 (A)(3).
109. Id. EC 7-37, EC 7-38, EC 7-39, DR 7-106(C)(6); ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.2(a)-(f) and accompanying commentary.
110. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 568, 145 A.2d 896 (1958). See
STEIN, supra note 13, at 20, 62. See also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 2,
at 279.
111. But see Commonwealth v. Tumpson, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 363 A.2d 1129 (1976)
(exploitation of inference was prejudicial and required new trial).
112. Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Toth, 455 Pa. 154, 314 A.2d 275 (1974) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Contra, Commonwealth v.
Stafford, 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d 590, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973). See Commonwealth
v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973).
113. 455 Pa. 154, 314 A.2d 275 (1974).
114. Id. at 156, 314 A.2d at 276-77.
to substantially impair, if not destroy, the purpose of the testimony by
inferring that the jury could disregard it.
115
A prosecutor is also forbidden to assert his own opinion about the
credibility of a witness.116 In Commonwealth v. Stafford,11 7 however, a
claimed disparagement of the defendant's alibi witnesses was found
improper but harmless. In his summation the prosecutor had stated, "As
a matter of fact, ladies and gentlemen, when that Bible was sitting up
here, I was afraid it was going to jump up and hit all three of them,
because they took an oath."" i8 Although it found that this remark did not
warrant a new trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on other
grounds." 9 Perhaps the court would have scrutinized the remark more
carefully had there been no other ground for reversal, since the statement
did convey to the jury the prosecutor's opinion about the testimony of the
alibi witnesses.
In general, comment on defense witnesses is limited to the evidence
and reasonable inferences therefrom. Opinionated evaluation should be
avoided. While some forms of opinion may be insufficient to warrant
reversal under the "improper but harmless" rule, as in Stafford,' 20 the
quasi-judicial nature of the prosecutorial function demands strict
compliance with professional ethical standards121 and a sincere effort to
avoid opinionated statements.
B. Comment On and Use of the Evidence Presented
1. The Prosecutor's Perception of the Evidence.
A lawyer is an officer of the court. It is his right and duty to
discuss the evidence in a light most favorable to his client, and
it is the jury's duty to consider both the evidence and also the
inferences from that evidence which opposing counsel have
brought to their attention. 1
22
The skillful counsellor will be able to argue beyond the evidence pre-
sented at trial and articulate legitimate inferences that can properly be
drawn from the evidence.
Courts in Pennsylvania allow prosecutors a wide latitude as long as
the inferences they draw can be fairly deduced from the facts in evi-
115. Id. at 157, 314 A.2d at 277. Cf. Commonwealth v. Cherry, -Pa.-, 378A.2d800
(1977).
116. ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-106(C)(4); ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNC-
TION, supra note 2, § 5.8(b). See Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 335 A.2d
751 (1975). See generally Comment, Right of Prosecutor to Comment on Credibility of
Defense Witnesses in Summation to Jury, 43 TENN. L. REV. 707 (1976).
117. 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d 590, cert; denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
118. Id. at 258, 299 A.2d at 593.
119. The conviction was reversed on the ground that remarks of the prosecutor during
summation concerning defendant's silence at time of arrest and until taking the stand were
prejudicial error. See notes 48-74 and accompanyingtext supra.
120. 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d 590, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
121. See notes 129-37 and accompanying text infra.
122. Commonwealth v. Brown, 309 Pa. 515, 524, 164 A. 726, 729 (1933).
dence. 23 The prosecutor may always argue that defendant's guilt is
clearly established by the evidence. 24 Problems arise, however, when a
prosecutor injects his personal opinion, 25 misstates the evidence, 126 or
exceeds "legitimate inferences therefrom.' '127 The principal difficulty
arises only when the district attorney attempts to interject his own specu-
lations to supplement the evidence before the jury. 128 This is both unpro-
fessional and unethical and falls short of the quasi-judicial standard by
which his conduct must be measured.
It is generally accepted that expressions of personal belief or opinion
have no proper place in a district attorney's argument to the jury. 129 This
prohibition "is based upon a recognition that this unsworn evidence
conveys to the jury the unwarranted inference that the prosecutor pos-
sesses by virtue of his office additional information which removes any
question of doubt as to the guilt of the accused."' 130 Also, by expressing
123. Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Talley, 456 Pa. 574, 318 A.2d 922 (1974); Commonwealth v. Goosby, 450 Pa. 609,301 A.2d
673 (1973); Commonwealth v. White, 442 Pa. 461, 275 A.2d 75 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 335 A.2d 751 (1975). See note 77 supra.
124. Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 316 Pa. 129, 173 A. 653 (1934). Compare Common-
wealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976).
125. Commonwealth v. Townsell, - Pa. -, 379 A.2d 98 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Toney, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 310 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253
(1977); Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 335 A.2d 751 (1975).
While a prosecutor, in order to present the Commonwealth's case in the most
favorable light, may make fair deductions and suggest to the jury appropriate
inferences from the evidence, a society cannot permit its agent to attempt to
prejudice the minds of the jury against the accused by making wholly unsupported
inferences that the accused deliberately deceived the jury.
Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512, 517, 295 A.2d 300, 302 (1972) (emphasis in original).
126. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -,
378 A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179,368 A.2d 253 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976); Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512,
295 A.2d 300 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hadok, 313 Pa. 110, 169 A. 111 (1933). But see
Commonwealth v. Boyd, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 378 A.2d 1253 (1977).
ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(a) provides, "The
prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. It is unprofes-
sional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury
as to the inferences it may draw." See also ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-24, DR 7-
106(C)(1), (4).
127. Commonwealth v. Toney, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 310 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d
287 (1976); Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 327 A.2d 27 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974); Commonwealth v. Fairbanks, 453 Pa. 90, 306
A.2d 866 (1973); Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512, 295 A.2d 300 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Tumpson, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 363 A.2d 1129 (1976). But see Commonwealth v. Touri,
295 Pa. 50, 144 A. 761 (1929).
128. See Commonwealth v. Toney, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 310 (1977).
129. Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Perkins, - Pa. -, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d
253 (1977); ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-24, DR 7-106(C)(4); ABA STANDARDS, PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(b). See notes 171-179 and accompanying text infra.
130. Commonwealth v. Talley, 456 Pa. 574, 581, 318 A.2d 922, 925-26 (1974) (Nix, J.,
concurring).
There are several reasons for the rule, long established, that a lawyer may not
properly state his personal belief either to the court or to the jury in the soundness
of his case. In the first place, his personal belief has no real bearing on the issue; no
witness would be permitted so to testify, even under oath, and subject to cross-
his personal belief about the guilt of the defendant, the prosecutor is
usurping the function of the jury and prejudging the defendant.13, The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confronted such a situation in Common-
wealth v. Maloney.132 The prosecutor in Maloney offered not only his
opinion about the guilt of the accused, but also stated that he would lose
faith in the judicial system if a verdict of guilty were not returned. 133 The
court felt that the nature of these remarks warranted a new trial since it
was unable to determine if the jury's deliberations had been affected. 134
Nevertheless, not all expressions of opinion constitute reversible
error. The remark must be so prejudicial that it has deprived the defendant
of a fair and impartial trial. 135 If it can be classified as a legitimate
inference from the evidence, the remark will be considered proper.
136
While the distinction between inference and noninference seems clear,
the line between inference and opinion is not as distinct. The prosecutor
can transform his opinion into inference simply by avoiding use of the
first person singular.' 37 To a major extent, this will eliminate the possibil-
ity that the jury could be unduly swayed by the personal conviction of the
prosecutor. Furthermore, a vigilant judge will be able to discern other
modes by which this conviction may be conveyed to the jury by a
prosecuting attorney.
2. The Use of Tangible Evidence .- The prosecutor's use of phys-
ical evidence and exhibits during his closing argument is limited to those
items properly introduced at trial. 138 He may exhibit such evidence as
examination, much less the lawyer without either. Also, if expression of personal
belief were permitted, it would give an improper advantage to the older and better
known lawyer, whose opinion would carry more weight, and also with the jury at
least, an undue advantage to an unscrupulous one. Furthermore, if such were
permitted, for counsel to omit to make such a positive assertion might be taken as
an admission that he did not believe in his case.
H.S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 147 (1953) (footnotes omitted). On the question of admission
of unsworn testimony, see notes 171-76 and accompanying text infra.
131. Commonwealth v. Russell, 456 Pa. 559, 322 A.2d 127 (1974). See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Townsell, - Pa. -, 379 A.2d 98 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378
A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v. Toney, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 310 (1977); Commonwealth
v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976); Commonwealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365
A.2d 1233 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 346 A.2d 59 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Lark, 460 Pa. 399, 333 A.2d 786(1975); Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525,
317 A.2d 205 (1974).
132. 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976).
133. Id. at 352, 365 A.2d at 1243. See notes 187-194 and accompanying text infra.
134. Id. at 354, 365 A.2d at 1243.
135. Id. Compare this test with that mentioned in Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa.
43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975). See Commonwealth v. Toney, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 310
(1977).
136. Commonwealth v. Talley, 456 Pa. 574, 318 A.2d 922 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Pilosky, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 233, 362 A.2d 253 (1976); Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 239 Pa.
Super. Ct. 256, 361 A.2d 750 (1976); Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 353
A.2d 751 (1975).
137. E.g., "It's inconceivable to me. ; "I just don't know"; "I'd probably lose
faith .. " Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 352, 365 A.2d 1237, 1243 (1976).
138. Commonwealth v. Mika, 317 Pa. 487, 177 A. 3 (1935); Commonwealth v. Hadok,
313 Pa. 110, 169A. 111 (1933).
firearms and victims' clothing, 139 as long as the presentation is conducted
without any attempt to arouse jury prejudice. 40 It is within the court's
discretion to maintain such displays within the limits of courtroom propri-
ety. 141 If it can be shown that the items were properly admitted into
evidence,1 42 the principles governing inference and opinion will deter-
mine what constitutes proper comment.
43
Generally, the use of objects not properly admitted into evidence is
improper. 4 In Commonwealth v. Glover 45 the assistant district attorney
displayed a knife, not in evidence, to the jury during his closing argu-
ment. Although the victim had been stabbed, no knife had been found or
produced at trial. The supreme court, while pointing out that the display
of the knife was clearly erroneous and irrelevant, ruled that the overall
effect of the impropriety was harmless. This conclusion was reached by
noting first that the jury was definitely aware that no knife had been
recovered and second, that the trial judge had firmly instructed the jurors
to disregard the exhibition.'" Although it is evident from the reasoning in
Glover why use of inadmissible evidence may be improper yet not
require reversal, the potential for prejudice is also readily apparent, and
strict compliance with evidentiary and ethical 47 rules will avert the
possibility of prejudice in an otherwise well-tried case.
While an emotional, physical display appealing to the passions and
prejudices of the jury is considered unethical,' 8 it may be properly
monitored by the judge. If the judge abuses his discretion, however, the
trial record will provide little aid for appellate review. This reason alone
justifies requiring a tight control on the use of physical evidence. Simple
demonstrations may result in the injection of opinion and the fabrication
of facts. While an absolute prohibition is not desirable because demon-
strations can be relevant and helpful to the jury, carefully limited displays
and exacting judicial discretion are essential to a fair trial.
139. See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 176 A.2d 421 (1962) on the use of
photographs in a murder trial.
140. Commonwealth v. Mika, 317 Pa. 487, 177 A. 3 (1935). See STEIN, supra note 13, at
35.
141. Commonwealth v. Mika, 317 Pa. 487, 177 A. 3 (1935).
142. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 366 Pa. 182, 76 A.2d 608 (1950); Commonwealth v.
Chavis, 357 Pa. 158, 53 A.2d 96, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 811 (1947).
143. See notes 122-37 and accompanying text supra.
144. See STEIN, supra note 13, at 34-35.
145. 446 Pa. 492, 286 A.2d 349 (1972).
146. Id. at 501, 286 A.2d at 353-54. "Emphatically, the district attorney should always
bear in mind his proper role in a trial of such great import [i.e., murder trial], and religiously
refrain from conduct unbecoming such a responsible trust." Commonwealth v. Dickerson,
406 Pa. 102, 109, 176 A.2d 421,425 (1962). See also People v. Riley, 20 App. Div. 2d 599, 245
N.Y.S.2d 439 (1963) (introduction of screwdriver when prosecutor knew it could not be
identified or received held improper).
147. ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-24, EC 7-25, EC 7-26, DR 7-106(C)(1); ABA
STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(a) and accompanying commen-
tary.
148. See note 180 infra.
C. Arguing Beyond the Evidence
Counsel's summations should be confined to the evidence presented
in the case. Reference to matters outside the record or to rules of law
during the closing argument may result in prejudicial error and require
either a mistrial or reversal.
1. Reference to the Fate of Codefendants. -Pennsylvania courts
follow the general rule of law that
where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same
criminal offense but are tried separately, the fact that one
defendant has pleaded guilty or is convicted is inadmissible as
against the other, since competent and satisfactory evidence
against one person charged with an offense is not necessarily so
against another person charged with the same offense.'49
Since the use of such evidence is improper in the case in chief, the
prosecutor may not refer to it in his closing argument. Consequently, the
defendant is convicted or acquitted solely on the merits of the case against
him and a strong case against one codefendant cannot be used to bolster a
weaker case in a subsequent trial of a codefendant.150
In Commonwealth v. Crow,'5' however, the prosecutor's comment
about the conviction of codefendants was met with an immediate instruc-
tion by the trial judge to disregard the statement. In ruling that the
reference did not justify overruling the denial of a motion to withdraw a
juror, 52 Justice Walling noted that the other convictions were "public
matters probably known to every man on the Crow jury." 5 3 While the
149. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 443 Pa. 234, 244-45, 279 A.2d 20, 26 (1971).
150. See STEIN, supra note 13, at 76-77.
151. 303 Pa. 91, 154 A. 283 (1931).
152. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1118 provides,
(a) Motions to withdraw a juror are abolished.
(b) When an event prejudicial to the defendant occurs during trial only the
defendant may move for a mistrial; the motion shall be made when the event is
disclosed. Otherwise, the trial judge may declare a mistrial only for reasons of
manifest necessity.
This language, including 1974 amendments, reflects the supreme court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949
(1974), in which the court in effect overruled Commonwealth v. Lauria, 450 Pa. 72, 297 A.2d
906 (1972). TheStewart decision quite broadly interpreted the then existing rule 1118 which
had-or so it seemed-forbidden a trial judge to order a mistrial sua sponte. But see
Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 191 A. 358 (1937). Relying on Illinois v. Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), and the application therein of the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment (made applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)),
Chief Justice Jones asserted in Stewart that "[t]he trial court ... has the inherent power
under appropriate circumstances and in the interests of justice to declare a mistrial .... "
456 Pa. at 450, 317 A.2d at 618 (Roberts & Manderino, JJ., dissenting). See Commonwealth
ex rel. Walton v. Aytch, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 4, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976). Compare
Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880 (1974) and Douglas v. State, 32 Md. App. 311,
360 A.2d 474 (1976). But see Commonwealth v. Blatstein, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 306, 332 A.2d
510 (1974).
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 443 Pa. 234, 279 A.2d 20 (1971) (Justice Roberts noted
that reference to the fate of a co-conspirator by the prosecutor, though error, should be
evaluated to determine whether harmless or not).
153. Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91 at 100, 154 A. 283 at 286 (1931).
best approach to this situation would be the joint trial of codefendants, 154
this may not always be desirable because one may be convicted for the
wrongdoing of another. 155 Therefore, the enforcement of the above pro-
hibition will often be necessary. Only upon a clear showing that the error
was harmless (as in Crow) should the defendant be denied relief.
2. Reading or Arguing Law.-The reading of law to the jury,
while not prohibited in Pennsylvania, is strongly discouraged. The major
fault with this practice is that it may lead to the use of counter-extracts by
the opposing party,1 56 which might confuse the jurors.
157
It was noted by the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Renzo 15s
that reading extracts of law was properly permitted within the discretion
and control of the judge. 159 In Commonwealth v. Trignani,160 however,
in response to an objection by the defendant that the trial judge had
charged the jury to ignore any law given either by the district attorney or
by defense counsel, the superior court hinted at a stricter approach. The
court's only remark was, "We might note in passing that the jury must
take the law from the court not from the counsel." 
161
While Renzo and Trignani might, at first glance, appear to conflict,
the two holdings can be reconciled. Trignani does not directly prohibit
the exercise of judicial discretion advocated in Renzo. It merely requires
that the jury receive the applicable law from the judge. 162 This require-
ment is not violated by allowing counsel to argue the law to the jury as
long as the judge properly charges the jury at the close of both summa-
tions.
Arguing law to the jury, while perhaps considered more acceptable
in some jurisdictions than reading, 163 is still subject to the requirement
that the law be presented accurately. 164 Failure to comply may confuse
the jury and could result in the granting of a new trial.165 In Common-
154. PA. R. CRIM. P. 219.
155. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 458-59 (1972); 5 F. WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1937, §§ 1934-1946 (12th ed. 1957).
156. In Pennsylvania if the prosecutor quotes his version of the law in closing, the
defendant will have no opportunity to counter, but use of legal extracts by the defendant
may elicit counter-readings by the prosecutor. See note II supra.
157. Commonwealth v. Renzo, 216 Pa. 147, 148, 65 A. 30, 31 (1906).
158. Id.
159. See generally ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-23. In some states the practice is
regulated by statute. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3319 (Supp. 1976).
160. 185 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 138 A.2d 215 (1958).
161. Id. at 338, 138 A.2d at 218. See also Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 137 Pa.
Super. Ct. 488, 9 A.2d 161 (1939).
162. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1119 requires the trial judge to charge the jury upon completion of
the closing arguments.
163. See STEIN, supra note 13, at 49-53.
164. See Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 191 A. 358 (1937) (prosecutor
corrected the improper assessment of defense counsel that life imprisonment was the most
drastic penalty that the jury could inflict).
165. Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 203-04, 185 A. 203, 521-22 (1936) (prose-
cutor's statement that "there is no reason for shedding human blood except in war," was
wholly unwarranted in light of the defendant's clearly defined claim of self defense).
wealth v. Wiggins166 the district attorney suggested that the defendant
had the burden of presenting a defense. While acknowledging that this
inference was manifestly erroneous, the court ruled that immediate cor-
rection by the trial court and instruction to the jury on the proper law was
sufficient to eliminate possible prejudice.
167
While counsel may be competent to present and argue law to the
jury, the better rule follows the rationale that jurors are "much more
likely to get clear ideas of the law if they receive it altogether from the
judge." 1 68 Allowing counsel to assume this task usurps the function of
the court. Independent efforts by counsel might also entail tainted state-
ments or piecemeal presentations. For these reasons, counsel should not
be permitted to read law to the jury and should be allowed to argue law
only under close judicial scrutiny. 69 Nevertheless, for the present, the
defendant must be prepared to show that the law was misread or impro-
perly presented to press a valid claim on appeal.
70
3. References to Evidence Not Offered or Admitted.-By re-
ferring to evidence beyond the scope of that presented during trial, the
prosecutor fails to comply with professional standards relating to the rules
of evidence. 171 For example, the presentation of testimony of an unsworn
witness is improper and prejudicial.' 72 This occurs when the prosecutor
attempts to relate what the victim would have said had he been alive to
testify. 173 Personal assertions of fact within the prosecutor's own knowl-
edge are also prohibited. In Commonwealth v. Joyner1 74 the prosecutor
made the following statement during his summation:
Well, don't you see what happened was when he was first
brought in there, he was on top of the world. His name was
spread all across every paper in the country. Matter of fact, I
recall I myself was out of the country, and at that time I read
166. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 71, 328 A.2d 520 (1974).
167. Id. at 73-74, 328 A.2d at 521-22.
168. Commonwealth v. Renzo, 216 Pa. 147, 148, 65 A. 30, 31 (1906). See NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 278-79.
169. In exercising their discretion to permit reported cases to be read to the jury,
trial judges should recognize that their discretion in such matters is one which
courts ought seldom exercise, for the reason that such a practice would lead to
confusion in trials, rather than enlightenment.
Pierce v. State, 34 Md. App. 654, -, 369 A.2d 140, 149 (1977).
170. E.g., in Commonwealth v. Renzo, 216 Pa. 147, 65 A. 30 (1906), it was held that
objection to the prosecutor's "reading garbled extracts" without any effort to show mis-
reading or perversion was "reprehensible."
171. See ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.9.
172. Commonwealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976).
173. See Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 327 A.2d
27 (1974); Commonwealth v. Talley, 456 Pa. 574, 318 A.2d 922 (1974) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing); Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974). See also ABA
STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(b) and accompanying commen-
tary. This again presents the problem of injecting the prosecutor's opinion. See notes 129-
137 and accompanying text supra.
174. 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976).
about it. It was even in Time Magazine the next week. They
were front-page and they are proud of it. 7
Justice Pomeroy held that this was a "flagrant" example of unsworn
testimony upon matters not of record and termed it "uncalled for and
unconscionable." 1
76
In addition to speculation and unsworn testimony, reference to
extraneous matters not presented at trial or relevant to the issues at hand
can also be prejudicial and is therefore improper argument. 177 A well-
noted exception to this rule sanctions matters of common knowledge or
other subjects of which courts will take judicial notice.T17 Notwithstand-
ing this exception, general ethics179 and fairness require that both counsel
limit themselves to the evidence relevant to the case.
D. Argument Appealing to the Interests of the Jury
Any attempts to sway the jurors' impartiality by appealing to their
peculiar interests are viewed in a most unfavorable light. The case should
be decided only upon the merits of the evidence presented and common
sense dictates that an extraneous appeal to special considerations of the
jury is both unethical and irrelevant." s°
1. Appeals to Taxpayer Interests.--On several occasions Pennsyl-
vania appellate tribunals have ordered new trials on the ground that
appealing to jurors' taxpayer status may have prejudiced their verdict. For
example, prosecutors have argued that the jurors would bear the burden
of supporting a child if a defendant were not convicted of bastardy' 8' and
that if the defendant were not sentenced to death the taxpayers would
175. Id. at 340-41, 365 A.2d at 1236.
176. Id. at 341, 365 A.2d at 1237.
177. Commonwealth v. Toney, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 310 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 240 Pa. 255, 87 A.
684 (1913); Commonwealth v. Forgione, 114 Pa. Super. Ct. 275, 173 A. 729 (1934); Common-
wealth v. Striepeke, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 82 (1906).
178. Illustrations from history or literature or other matters of common knowledge may
be argued to the jury although they have no factual basis in the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Brown, 309 Pa. 515, 164 A. 726 (1933). This rule, however, applies only to "universally
recognized and accepted works of literature or science." Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa.
392, 397, 45 A.2d 43, 45 (1946). In Sykes, the court held that it was not an abuse of discretion
to refuse to allow use of a book written by Lewis E. Lawes, a former warden of Sing Sing
prison, to show that the number of murder cases had decreased in states that had abolished
capital punishment. See also Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 132 A.2d
733 (1957) (reference to betrayal of Christ by Judas).
For a discussion of matters of which courts will take judicial notice, see 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2565-2583 (1940). See also STEIN, supra note 13, at 19-20. See generally ABA
STANDARDS. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.9 and accompanying commentary.
179. ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-24, EC 7-25, DR 7-106(C)(1); ABA STANDARDS,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(a), (d).
180. See ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-106(C)(1); ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, supra note 2, §§ 5.4(b),5.8(c), (d); H.S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 84-85 (1953);
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 280. See also STEIN, supra note 13, at
71-73.
181. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 564, 307 A.2d 394 (1973).
have to support him in the penitentiary. 182 Both of these statements were
found to have warped the judgment of the jury "by the thought of the
expense to the Commonwealth which would affect them as
taxpayers." 183
Not all such arguments are always incurable, however. In Common-
wealth v. Burns, 184 the prosecutor's statement that the money embezzled
by the superintendent of a county home for the aged was the jurors' own
money did not constitute reversible error since the trial judge delivered
immediate corrective instructions. Judge Ervin noted that the defendant
had admitted that the money belonged to the county and credited the
jurors with enough intelligence to realize that it was actually taxpayers'
money. 185 In addition, the court emphasized that such a remark would be
reversible error only if it appeared to have generated prejudice that, in
light of all surrounding circumstances, actually affected the verdict.
1s6
2. Reference to Crime in General.-In Commonwealth v.
McHugh18 7 the superior court enunciated the following rule governing
exhortations to jurors to uphold their duty to society: "A district attorney
may argue, within the bounds of propriety, in favor of law and order, and
in so doing may remind the jury of the danger to the community posed by
persons prone to resort to violence." '88 Argument should not exceed
these limits and if its unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury, relief
must be granted to the defendant. 89
In Commonwealth v. Harvell'90 the prosecutor included the follow-
ing remarks in his closing argument:
I say to you now don't be fooled. Don't let this defendant
come into this courtroom and fool you into acquitting him and
letting him walk out on this street again where he can rob and
beat others. You are the community. You are to judge this
defendant based upon what you have heard about him, based
upon the facts of this case.
182. Commonwealth v. Clark, 322 Pa. 321, 185 A. 764 (1936); see Commonwealth v.
Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 191 A. 358 (1937); cf. Narciso v. Mauch Chunk Twp., 369 Pa. 549,87
A.2d 233 (1952) (civil case).
183. Commonwealth v. Clark, 322 Pa. 321, 325, 185 A. 764, 766 (1936); cf. Common-
wealth v. Wilcox, 112 Pa. Super. Ct. 240, 170 A. 455 (1934) (In prosecution of corporate
officer for embezzlement of trust company funds, assistant district attorney's remark that
the money converted belonged to depositors was held not improper).
184. 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 208, 182 A.2d 232 (1962).
185. Id. at 220, 182 A.2d at 238.
186. Id.
187. 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 568, 145 A.2d 896 (1958).
188. Id, at 576, 145 A.2d at 901. See also Commonwealth v. Mika, 317 Pa. 487, 177 A. 3
(1935); Commonwealth v. Del Giorno, 303 Pa. 509, 154 A. 786 (1931); Commonwealth v.
Morrison, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 121, 118 A.2d 258 (1956); Commonwealth v. Shultz, 111 Pa.
Super. Ct. 407, 170 A. 462 (1934).
189. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 568,576, 145 A.2d 896,901(1958).
See also Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 365 A.2d 1233 (1976); Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495,341 A.2d
492 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lark, 460 Pa. 399, 33 A.2d 786 (1975).
190. 458 Pa. 406, 327 A.2d 27 (1974).
It's awfully hard to walk the streets today. People don't
want to go out at night. The want to hurry from work and get in
before it gets dark. They're afraid to walk to their mailbox to
drop a letter in the mail to a child, a mother or a father. Men are
afraid to walk the streets themselves; afraid to walk their dogs
out; afraid to run out to the car for something for fear that they
won't come back home because individuals like this defendant
are out preying along the streets, beating people, robbing peo-
ple, taking things which don't belong to them. Now, you can sit
back and allow him to do that again if you want to. You can
send [him] back out there. You can. But it might be one of you
next time. It might be one of you. 91
Considering this argument in conjunction with the presentation of tes-
timony by an unsworn witness, 192 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
the remarks to be so prejudicial as to require reversal. 193
The application of the nebulous McHugh standard is necessarily a
matter for the trial court. Usually such argument is beyond the matter in
issue and should be excluded for that reason alone. A prosecutor must,
however, be allowed some latitude to effectively perform his duties and
to fairly counter the defendant's appeals for sympathy. The line should be
drawn when the prosecution ceases to try the accused for the crime with
which he has been charged and instead incites jury emotion to convict the
defendant for crime in general.' 94
3. Reference to the Crime in Issue.-Although the prosecutor
should refrain from using arguments calculated to inflame the passions or
prejudices of the jury, 195 at the same time fair description or comment on
the evidence of the crime is permissible. 196 Nevertheless, depicting the
crime as a "most atrocious one" and referring to the defendant as "[a]
cold, bloodless demon" who killed "not in the ordinary paroxym of
murder," "but sitting there as a fiend would, as a demon would, in the
ordinary display of the devilment in his disposition" has been held
improper as preventing the jury's impartial deliberation. 1
97
As is the case in many of these categories of improper argument, the
governing guideline is grounded in common sense. The limits imposed by
the evidence presented are the restraints most easily followed, and a
191. Id. at 408, 327 A.2d at 29. See also Commonwealth v. Townsell, - Pa. -, 379
A.2d 98 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800 (1977).
192. See notes 172-76 and accompanying text supra.
193. See ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(c), (d). See
also STEIN, supra note 13, at 17-18.
194. See Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800 (1977) (prosecutor's
remark -to the jury to tell the people of Philadelphia that "shootings on the street like the
wild west" will not be tolerated, held improper). See also Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa.
495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975).
195. ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 2, § 5.8(c) and accompany-
ing commentary.
196. Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 191 A. 358 (1937). Compare Common-
wealth v. Del Giorno, 303 Pa. 509, 154 A. 786 (1931).
197. Commonwealth v. Williams, 309 Pa. 529, 533, 164 A. 532, 533 (1932).
comment should not prompt a mistrial when it does "not present to the
jurors a more terrible picture than . . . described by the witnesses." 198
While this standard is not totally objective, it greatly reduces the margin
of uncertainty.
Argument calculated to inflame the jury by reference to the victim of
a crime is similarly improper and prejudicial.1 99 Not all such references
are necessarily inflammatory, particularly if they logically follow from
the facts in issue. 200 When the prosecutor goes beyond the testimony
presented, however, and speculates about what the victim's testimony
would have been,20 the courts uniformly condemn such statements as
testimony by an unsworn witness and as expressions of personal belief.
2°2
As with description of the criminal act, the line is drawn between
pertinent description and argument designed solely, or partially, to arouse
animosity against the accused. This distinction is clearly illustrated in
Commonwealth v. Collins ,203 a case replete with prosecutorial miscon-
duct and "strategy calculated to try the case on [the prosecutor's] own
terms rather than within the rules of evidence and the standards of
professional conduct." 2 I6 In addition to other infractions, 2 5 the prosecu-
tor dramatically portrayed for the jury the slow and painful death the
victim was forced to suffer, having to "lie with his face in the mud, with
the rain coming down, without a blessed soul there to put their hand on
his shoulder and say, 'Don't worry about it; everything will be all right,'
even though he was dying .... ",206 Reversing the first degree murder
conviction, the court condemned this depiction as an expression of the
personal opinion of the prosecutor.
207
While some latitude should be afforded the prosecutor in describing
the effect of the criminal act upon the victim, excesses, as in Collins,
should be strongly condemned. Nevertheless, the full impact of the crime
should be presented to the jury as a counterbalance to the defense
attorney's pleas for sympathy. To be sure, the appearance of a murderer
at trial, well dressed and far removed from the actual crime, presents a far
different picture than was afforded the victim.
20 8
198. Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 31, 191 A. 359, 361 (1937). For argument
exceeding this standard, see Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975).
199. Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d
492 (1975); Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 327 A.2d 27 (1974).
200. Commonwealth v. Pilosky, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 233, 362 A. 24 253 (1976).
201. This would be applicable primarily in a murder case.
202. See notes 171-76 and accompanying text supra. See also Commonwealth v.
Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 499, 341 A.2d at 493.
205. Id. at 499-500, 341 A.2d at 493-94.
206. Id. at 499-500, 341 A.2d at 494.
207. Id. See notes 129-37 and accompanying text supra.
208. But see Commonwealth v. Townsell, - Pa. -, 379 A.2d 98 (1977).
IV. Procedural Aspects of the Closing Argument
A. Recording
While there is no constitutional requirement that a trial be steno-
graphically preserved, 20 9 Pennsylvania statutorily provides that criminal
proceedings be recorded, "whenever requested by any defendant or his
. . . counsel, before or during the trial."20 Although this remains the
law in Pennsylvania today, it has been held that the refusal of defendant's
request to record the district attorney's summation is not reversible
error.211
B. Objection to Improper Argument
The test for review of the validity of an objection has been stated in
several ways.2 ' 2 Generally, a new trial is required when the remark is of
such a prejudicial nature or substance, or has been delivered in such a
manner that it reasonably might have deprived the defendant of a fair and
impartial trial. 213 The case books are replete, however, with valid appel-
late claims that the courts have refused to review because of defendant's
Under the present Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301-
1382 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (see Comment, Changes in Pennsylvania's Sentencing Procedures
Under the Proposed "Code of Sentencing Procedure," 78 DicK. L. REV. 136 (1973)) and the
rules of criminal procedure, PA. R. CRIM. P. 1400-1415, the judge presiding at trial must
impose the sentence. While in a murder trial the jury considers aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977); Comment,
Resurrection of Capital Punishment-The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REv. 543,
566-73 (1977); but see Commonwealth v. Moody, - Pa. -, - A.2d - (1977) (court held
Pennsylvania's capital punishment law unconstitutional), nevertheless this deliberation oc-
curs after the verdict is returned. Consequently, argument to the jury about sentencing or
other consequences of a particular verdict is both improper and unnecessary. Such argu-
ment has its proper place, if at all, only at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 378 A.2d 1278 (1977).
209. Commonwealth ex rel. Turk v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 323, 74 A.2d 656 (1950).
210. Act of May 5, 1911, P.L. 161, (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1802 (Purdon
1962)). See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 441 Pa. 483, 272 A.2d 877 (1971) (court dealt at
length with the issue of whether failure to record the trial proceedings was a denial of
constitutional due process in that it precluded a meaningful appeal for the defendant. The
court concluded that while recording is not a due process requirement per se, the defendant
must at least be provided with an adequate alternative. Defendant had been denied such an
alternative because of new counsel on appeal). For a case in which the closing arguments
were recorded at the court's discretion, see Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d
338 (1955).
211. See Commonwealth v. Howard, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 239 A.2d 829 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Musser, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 44, 92 A.2d 270 (1953). In both cases it was
acknowledged that counsel always has the right to put on the record anything objectionable
contained in the prosecutor's remarks to the jury.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Turk v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 323, 74 A.2d 656 (1950), it
was held that because the defendant failed to request stenographic reporting of the trial, he
could not complain after conviction that he was deprived of due process under the federal
constitution and liberty under the state constitution.
212. See Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975); Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512,
295 A.2d 300 (1972); Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 256, 361 A.2d 750
(1976).
213. Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976).
failure to interpose timely or proper objection. 214 The proper procedure to
raise an objection is articulated in Commonwealth v. Mika :215
There is an established method of procedure which must be
followed by a party who wishes to make objectionable remarks
of counsel a basis for an appeal. Following the objection and
request for the withdrawal of a juror, the court should direct the
stenographer to place upon the record the remarks as the court
understood them; on his failure to do so, counsel may place the
remarks on the record by affidavit. Whichever course is pur-
sued, the objection and request for the withdrawal of a juror
should be made at once, as soon as the objectionable language
is used.216
The failure to raise timely objection results in a waiver of that excep-
tion.217 Nevertheless, even though a waiver may have occurred, a convic-
tion may be reversed on appeal if there has been a clear abuse of judicial
discretion.218
Two rules have emerged that determine whether an objection was
timely. In cases in which the defendant fails to request that the prosecu-
tor's closing argument be recorded219 or in which the request has been
refused,220 the objection must be made at the time of the allegedly
improper remarks. 221 When the entire summation is transcribed, objec-
214. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 Pa. 512, 359 A.2d 393 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blatstein, 231 Pa.
Super. Ct. 306, 332 A.2d 510 (1974).
215. 317 Pa. 487, 177 A. 3 (1935).
216. Id. at 489, 177 A. 3, 4 (1935. See also Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 112 Pa. Super.
Ct. 240, 170 A. 455 (1934), aff'd, 316 Pa. 129, 173 A. 653 (1934); Commonwealth v. Windish,
176 Pa. 167, 34 A. 1019 (1896); Commonwealth v. King, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 168, 323 A.2d 260
(1974). In Pennsylvania the motion for a mistrial has replaced the motion for the withdrawal
of a juror. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1118. See note 152 supra.
217. Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 Pa. 512, 359 A.2d 393 (1976). "A party may not
remain silent and take chances on a verdict and afterwards complain of matters which, if
erroneous, the Court would have corrected." Commonwealth v. Blatstein, 231 Pa. Super.
Ct. 306, 320, 332 A.2d 510, 516 (1974) (quoting from Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380,
382, 305 A.2d 14, 16 (1973)). See also Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253
(1977).
218. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 442 Pa. 18, 274 A.2d 767 (1971).
Abuse of discretion-Decision by whim or caprice, arbitrarily, or from a bad
motive which amounts practically to a denial of justice as a clearly erroneous
conclusion, one that is clearly against logic and effect of the facts presented.
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 8 (3d ed. 1969).
For two cases finding no abuse of discretion, see Commonwealth v. Drischler, 175 Pa.
Super. Ct. 74, 103 A.2d 467 (1954); Commonwealth v. Narr, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 148, 96 A.2d
155 (1953). See also note 152 and accompanying text supra.
219. Commonwealth v. King, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 168, 323 A.2d 260 (1974)..
220. See note 211 supra.
221. Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955); Commonwealth v.
King, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 168, 323 A.2d 260 (1974).
The purpose of the rule requiring an objection during argument is to ensure an
accurate record on appeal. Where the argument is unrecorded, it is necessary to
require an objection during argument so the challenged remarks can be placed in
the record at or about the time they are made. Otherwise, the recollection of both
counsel and the court may differ and thereby result in unnecessary factual dis-
putes.
Commonwealth v. Perkins, - Pa. -, -, 373 A.2d 1076, 1084 n.10 (1977).
tion at the close of the argument and a motion for mistrial222 have been
deemed sufficient. 223 Under these rules no dispute will arise about what
counsel has said, and there is no need to require that defense counsel
immediately interrupt during a closing argument.224
C. Procedural Deficiencies and Suggestions
Neither the legislature nor the judiciary can cure what is probably the
most serious procedural problem: the failure of counsel to raise a timely
objection to the prosecution's improper argument. Counsel must be made
aware of the appropriate time to object. Despite the current problem,
however, the courts should require strict compliance with the objection-
waiver rule and should continue to review only those cases in which a
manifest abuse of discretion has occurred, absent a timely objection
during trial.225
If the defendant is required to raise his objection at the moment of
the impropriety, there is a much better chance that the trial judge can
remedy the situation. 226 Prompt objection could avert any developing
prejudice and, at the same time, avoid a costly retrial that would not have
been necessary had the objection been raised before the prosecutor fully
exploited the improper comment.
Since there is no requirement that the closing argument be
recorded227 the defendant is at the mercy of an ineffective objection
222. See Commonwealth v. Blatstein, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 306, 332 A.2d 510 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 140 A.2d 347 (1958).
223. Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Perkins, - Pa. -, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d
253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976).
224. Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976). The better rule,
however, would require immediate objection. In this way the possibility of future abuse
could be halted, and the court could promptly render curative instruction.
.225. Defense counsel should not be permitted to withhold objection and rely on the
prosecutor's improper comments as a basis for reversal. Not only does such conduct violate
ethical standards, it also denies defendant adequate assistance of counsel. Under Common-
wealth v. Stowers, 363 Pa. 435, 70 A.2d 226 (1950), it is the well established rule that an
appellate court will not reverse on a point when no exception was taken by appellant, unless
there has been a basic and fundamental error. See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543,
168 A. 244 (1933).
For an interesting contrast between two standards for review of error not raised at trial,
see Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968); Commonwealth v. Scoleri,
432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968); and Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301
(1968). All three cases were decided the same day, and in each case the justices split on the
question whether to apply the "basic and fundamental" error test or, as proposed by Justice
Roberts, a test based upon the ability of the trial court to correct the error had it been
brought to its attention. See note 218 supra.
226. Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976) (Even though objec-
tion was not made until the close of the prosecutor's argument the trial court had adequate
warning of the nature of the objection before it charged the jury and was provided with
adequate opportunity to correct the impropriety); See Commonwealth v. Cherry, - Pa. -,
378 A.2d 800 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); cf.
Commonwealth v. Tumpson, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 1,363 A.2d 1129 (1976) (prejudice was not
neutralized by immediate warning or subsequent charge to jury, and reversal was required).
See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 471, 364 A.2d 368.(1976).
227. See note 210 and accompanying text supra.
procedure. If defense counsel interposes timely objection, but fails to
have the allegedly prejudicial statements placed on the record, they will
not be reviewable on appeal. 228 Moreover, the alternative filing of af-
fidavits by defense counsel leads to conflicting views about what was
stated by the prosecuting attorney. 229 Furthermore, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for an appellate tribunal to review an incomplete record and
determine the overall effect of improper remarks.23° More importantly,
unless the full argument is recorded, appellate courts are unable to
properly decide whether there has been an abuse of judicial discretion at
trial.
23 1
Perhaps the best way to remedy this situation is to require mandatory
recording of all closing arguments in criminal cases. 23 2 In this way, the
occurrence of many of the problems inherent in the present procedural
structures can be reduced if not eliminated. The additional cost will be
minimal, since the procedure is already available upon request and, in
any event, the benefit far outweighs the expense. Neither is this idea
unique, for it is currently the practice of federal district courts.
233
V. Conclusion
The closing arguments of Pennsylvania's prosecuting attorneys are
now regulated statutorily and judicially. These limitations are desirable
and necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair and impartial
trial. While these rules may restrain a zealous prosecutor, the quasi-
judicial nature of his position dictates the role he must perform. Whether
these limitations have been violated is a matter within the discretion of the
trial judge because he is in the best position to weigh the overall effect of
the prosecutor's summation. The rules are solidly grounded in common
228. Commonwealth v. Blatstein, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 306, 332 A.2d 510 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 89, 140 A.2d 347 (1958); Commonwealth v.
Musser, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 44, 92 A.2d 270 (1952).
229. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 475, 341 A.2d 206 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Trimarchi, 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 307, 2 A.2d 540 (1938).
230. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 270 Pa. 583, 113 A. 844 (1921); Commonwealth v.
Adams, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 475, 341 A.2d 206 (1975); Commonwealth v. King, 227 Pa. Super.
Ct. 168, 323 A.2d 260 (1974); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 121,118 A.2d
258 (1956); Commonwealth v. Drischler, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 103 A.2d 467 (1954);
Commonwealth v. Kerr, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 89 A.2d 889 (1952); Commonwealth v.
Trimarchi, 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 307, 2 A.2d 540 (1938); Commonwealth v. Davison, 99 Pa.
Super. Ct. 412 (1930); Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 86 Pa. Super. Ct. 382 (1923); Common-
wealth v. Durlin, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 260 (1920); Commonwealth v. Norman, 67 Berks 98 (Pa.
C.P. 1974).
231. See Commonwealth v. Valle, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 411, 362 A.2d 1021 (1976)
(counsel's failure to object because "he probably felt the remarks were within the proper
range of advocacy" did not provide a "reasonable basis" for refusal to review when
ineffectiveness of counsel was apparent in the record).
232. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 441 Pa. 483, 272 A.2d 877 (1971), for an excel-
lent review by Justice Eagen of the development and state of mandatory recording proce-
dures as addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
233. Federal District Court Reporters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1971). Failure to comply
with this requirement under the act does not warrant reversal per se. See Edwards v. United
States, 374 F.2d 24 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
sense and, while there may be some areas of uncertainty, an experienced
prosecutor should have little difficulty in presenting an effective and
forceful, yet proper, argument to the jury.
Despite the effectiveness of the limitations, Pennsylvania's pro-
cedural framework is in need of reform. Mandatory recording would
vastly improve the system. Furthermore, strict compliance with the ob-
jection-waiver rule will enhance the quality of trial procedure. While the
prosecutor should continually strive to maintain the impartiality vital to
his quasi-judicial role, defense counsel must be expected to provide
adequate protection for the defendant when this impartiality is breached.
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